)]}'
{
  "commit": "b44341e39d856e4cc6ad8ed94ebffd440f39846c",
  "tree": "2aae81a868c9f0585c7872a0e1f104ecfe2c5033",
  "parents": [
    "8457ca071faba9dec2dde99f78da9c5af289e955"
  ],
  "author": {
    "name": "Jan Kara",
    "email": "jack@suse.cz",
    "time": "Thu Oct 22 13:25:35 2026 +0200"
  },
  "committer": {
    "name": "Christian Brauner",
    "email": "brauner@kernel.org",
    "time": "Fri Oct 30 16:12:43 2026 +0100"
  },
  "message": "aio: avoid request count overflow in ioctx_alloc()\n\nioctx_alloc() saves the 32-bit nr_events in max_reqs, then doubles\nnr_events before checking the ring-size bound.  For\nnr_events\u003d0x80000001, the doubled value wraps to 2, so the ring check\npasses and aio_setup_ring() builds a one-page/127-slot ring.  The\noriginal 0x80000001 is still stored in ctx-\u003emax_reqs and charged to the\nglobal aio_nr quota.\n\nIf an administrator has raised fs.aio-max-nr to at least 0x80000001,\nan unprivileged process can create that context and make later normal\nio_setup() calls fail with -EAGAIN until the wrapped context is\ndestroyed.\n\nCheck for too large number of requests before multiplying.\n\nLink: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261022091748.3653127-1-teel4res@gmail.com\nReported-by: Cheng Yongkang \u003cteel4res@gmail.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Jan Kara \u003cjack@suse.cz\u003e\nLink: https://patch.msgid.link/20261022112534.3513745-2-jack@suse.cz\nSigned-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) \u003cbrauner@kernel.org\u003e\n",
  "tree_diff": [
    {
      "type": "modify",
      "old_id": "893db6961ad3b63db464ebfa29feafb448b3b278",
      "old_mode": 33188,
      "old_path": "fs/aio.c",
      "new_id": "bf002a9d2ad79051a1b67d3d14dde832726b131a",
      "new_mode": 33188,
      "new_path": "fs/aio.c"
    }
  ]
}
