| // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 | |
| /* | |
| * Copyright (C) 2026 Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> | |
| * | |
| * Test that completing a filesystem context from another user namespace | |
| * doesn't warn. | |
| * | |
| * fsopen() records the caller's user namespace in fc->user_ns and hands | |
| * back an ordinary file descriptor. The task that issues | |
| * FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE need not be the one that created the context: the fd | |
| * is inherited across fork() and exec() and it can be passed over a unix | |
| * socket. vfs_cmd_create() authorizes the create with mount_capable(), | |
| * which for FS_USERNS_MOUNT checks ns_capable(fc->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN), | |
| * and that succeeds for a task holding CAP_SYS_ADMIN in an ancestor of | |
| * fc->user_ns. | |
| * | |
| * binfmt_misc and overlayfs used to WARN_ON() that mismatch, which let an | |
| * unprivileged user taint the kernel, flood the log and panic a kernel | |
| * booted with panic_on_warn. The mount must still be refused, but it must | |
| * not warn. | |
| */ | |
| #define _GNU_SOURCE | |
| #include <errno.h> | |
| #include <sched.h> | |
| #include <stdio.h> | |
| #include <stdlib.h> | |
| #include <string.h> | |
| #include <sys/socket.h> | |
| #include <sys/wait.h> | |
| #include <unistd.h> | |
| #include "../wrappers.h" | |
| #include "../utils.h" | |
| #include "../../kselftest_harness.h" | |
| #ifndef FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE | |
| #define FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE 6 | |
| #endif | |
| /* TAINT_WARN, i.e. bit 9 of /proc/sys/kernel/tainted. */ | |
| #define TAINT_WARN_BIT 9 | |
| static bool taint_warn_set(void) | |
| { | |
| unsigned long taint = 0; | |
| FILE *f; | |
| f = fopen("/proc/sys/kernel/tainted", "r"); | |
| if (!f) | |
| return false; | |
| if (fscanf(f, "%lu", &taint) != 1) | |
| taint = 0; | |
| fclose(f); | |
| return taint & (1UL << TAINT_WARN_BIT); | |
| } | |
| static int send_fd(int sock, int fd) | |
| { | |
| char cmsgbuf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))] = {}; | |
| char b[1] = { 'x' }; | |
| struct iovec iov = { .iov_base = b, .iov_len = sizeof(b) }; | |
| struct msghdr msg = { | |
| .msg_iov = &iov, | |
| .msg_iovlen = 1, | |
| .msg_control = cmsgbuf, | |
| .msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgbuf), | |
| }; | |
| struct cmsghdr *cmsg; | |
| cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg); | |
| cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET; | |
| cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS; | |
| cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int)); | |
| memcpy(CMSG_DATA(cmsg), &fd, sizeof(int)); | |
| return sendmsg(sock, &msg, 0) < 0 ? -1 : 0; | |
| } | |
| static int recv_fd(int sock) | |
| { | |
| char cmsgbuf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))] = {}; | |
| char b[1]; | |
| struct iovec iov = { .iov_base = b, .iov_len = sizeof(b) }; | |
| struct msghdr msg = { | |
| .msg_iov = &iov, | |
| .msg_iovlen = 1, | |
| .msg_control = cmsgbuf, | |
| .msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgbuf), | |
| }; | |
| struct cmsghdr *cmsg; | |
| int fd = -1; | |
| if (recvmsg(sock, &msg, 0) <= 0) | |
| return -1; | |
| cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg); | |
| if (!cmsg || cmsg->cmsg_type != SCM_RIGHTS) | |
| return -1; | |
| memcpy(&fd, CMSG_DATA(cmsg), sizeof(int)); | |
| return fd; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Create a context for @fsname in a child and complete it here. With @nest | |
| * the child first creates its own user namespace, so that the context is | |
| * created in a descendant of the namespace completing it. The child needs a | |
| * mount namespace of its own as well: fsopen() gates on may_mount(), which | |
| * asks for CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the user namespace owning the caller's mount | |
| * namespace. | |
| * | |
| * Returns the result of FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE with errno set, or -ENODATA if | |
| * the child could not create the context at all. | |
| */ | |
| static int create_from_child(const char *fsname, bool nest) | |
| { | |
| int sock[2], fd, ret, status; | |
| pid_t pid; | |
| if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sock)) | |
| return -ENODATA; | |
| pid = fork(); | |
| if (pid < 0) { | |
| close(sock[0]); | |
| close(sock[1]); | |
| return -ENODATA; | |
| } | |
| if (pid == 0) { | |
| close(sock[0]); | |
| if (nest && unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNS)) | |
| _exit(1); | |
| fd = sys_fsopen(fsname, 0); | |
| if (fd < 0) | |
| _exit(1); | |
| if (send_fd(sock[1], fd)) | |
| _exit(1); | |
| _exit(0); | |
| } | |
| close(sock[1]); | |
| fd = recv_fd(sock[0]); | |
| close(sock[0]); | |
| wait_for_pid(pid); | |
| waitpid(pid, &status, WNOHANG); | |
| if (fd < 0) | |
| return -ENODATA; | |
| errno = 0; | |
| ret = sys_fsconfig(fd, FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE, NULL, NULL, 0); | |
| status = errno; | |
| close(fd); | |
| errno = status; | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| FIXTURE(fscontext_ns) { | |
| bool warn_before; | |
| }; | |
| FIXTURE_SETUP(fscontext_ns) | |
| { | |
| self->warn_before = taint_warn_set(); | |
| if (setup_userns() != 0) | |
| SKIP(return, "setup_userns failed"); | |
| } | |
| FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(fscontext_ns) | |
| { | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * The condition the kernel used to WARN about. It has to be refused, and it | |
| * has to be refused quietly: an unprivileged task reaches this. | |
| */ | |
| FIXTURE_VARIANT(fscontext_ns) { | |
| const char *fsname; | |
| int expected_errno; | |
| }; | |
| FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(fscontext_ns, binfmt_misc) { | |
| .fsname = "binfmt_misc", | |
| .expected_errno = EINVAL, | |
| }; | |
| FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(fscontext_ns, overlay) { | |
| .fsname = "overlay", | |
| .expected_errno = EIO, | |
| }; | |
| TEST_F(fscontext_ns, create_from_descendant_userns) | |
| { | |
| int ret; | |
| ret = create_from_child(variant->fsname, true); | |
| if (ret == -ENODATA) | |
| SKIP(return, "%s unavailable", variant->fsname); | |
| ASSERT_EQ(-1, ret); | |
| ASSERT_EQ(variant->expected_errno, errno); | |
| /* | |
| * Only meaningful if nothing had warned before us. Note that an | |
| * unrelated warning racing this test would look like a failure. | |
| */ | |
| if (self->warn_before) | |
| TH_LOG("TAINT_WARN already set, not checking for a new warning"); | |
| else | |
| ASSERT_FALSE(taint_warn_set()); | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * The same handover within one user namespace is a supported thing to do and | |
| * has to keep working. binfmt_misc takes no options, so the create succeeds | |
| * outright and this also shows the test really drives the create path. | |
| */ | |
| TEST(create_from_same_userns) | |
| { | |
| int ret; | |
| if (setup_userns() != 0) | |
| SKIP(return, "setup_userns failed"); | |
| ret = create_from_child("binfmt_misc", false); | |
| if (ret == -ENODATA) | |
| SKIP(return, "binfmt_misc unavailable"); | |
| ASSERT_EQ(0, ret); | |
| } | |
| TEST_HARNESS_MAIN |