| .. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 | |
| Attack Vector Controls | |
| ====================== | |
| Attack vector controls provide a simple method to configure only the mitigations | |
| for CPU vulnerabilities which are relevant given the intended use of a system. | |
| Administrators are encouraged to consider which attack vectors are relevant and | |
| disable all others in order to recoup system performance. | |
| When new relevant CPU vulnerabilities are found, they will be added to these | |
| attack vector controls so administrators will likely not need to reconfigure | |
| their command line parameters as mitigations will continue to be correctly | |
| applied based on the chosen attack vector controls. | |
| Attack Vectors | |
| -------------- | |
| There are 5 sets of attack-vector mitigations currently supported by the kernel: | |
| #. :ref:`user_kernel` | |
| #. :ref:`user_user` | |
| #. :ref:`guest_host` | |
| #. :ref:`guest_guest` | |
| #. :ref:`smt` | |
| To control the enabled attack vectors, see :ref:`cmdline`. | |
| .. _user_kernel: | |
| User-to-Kernel | |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ | |
| The user-to-kernel attack vector involves a malicious userspace program | |
| attempting to leak kernel data into userspace by exploiting a CPU vulnerability. | |
| The kernel data involved might be limited to certain kernel memory, or include | |
| all memory in the system, depending on the vulnerability exploited. | |
| If no untrusted userspace applications are being run, such as with single-user | |
| systems, consider disabling user-to-kernel mitigations. | |
| Note that the CPU vulnerabilities mitigated by Linux have generally not been | |
| shown to be exploitable from browser-based sandboxes. User-to-kernel | |
| mitigations are therefore mostly relevant if unknown userspace applications may | |
| be run by untrusted users. | |
| *user-to-kernel mitigations are enabled by default* | |
| .. _user_user: | |
| User-to-User | |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^ | |
| The user-to-user attack vector involves a malicious userspace program attempting | |
| to influence the behavior of another unsuspecting userspace program in order to | |
| exfiltrate data. The vulnerability of a userspace program is based on the | |
| program itself and the interfaces it provides. | |
| If no untrusted userspace applications are being run, consider disabling | |
| user-to-user mitigations. | |
| Note that because the Linux kernel contains a mapping of all physical memory, | |
| preventing a malicious userspace program from leaking data from another | |
| userspace program requires mitigating user-to-kernel attacks as well for | |
| complete protection. | |
| *user-to-user mitigations are enabled by default* | |
| .. _guest_host: | |
| Guest-to-Host | |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^ | |
| The guest-to-host attack vector involves a malicious VM attempting to leak | |
| hypervisor data into the VM. The data involved may be limited, or may | |
| potentially include all memory in the system, depending on the vulnerability | |
| exploited. | |
| If no untrusted VMs are being run, consider disabling guest-to-host mitigations. | |
| *guest-to-host mitigations are enabled by default if KVM support is present* | |
| .. _guest_guest: | |
| Guest-to-Guest | |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ | |
| The guest-to-guest attack vector involves a malicious VM attempting to influence | |
| the behavior of another unsuspecting VM in order to exfiltrate data. The | |
| vulnerability of a VM is based on the code inside the VM itself and the | |
| interfaces it provides. | |
| If no untrusted VMs, or only a single VM is being run, consider disabling | |
| guest-to-guest mitigations. | |
| Similar to the user-to-user attack vector, preventing a malicious VM from | |
| leaking data from another VM requires mitigating guest-to-host attacks as well | |
| due to the Linux kernel phys map. | |
| *guest-to-guest mitigations are enabled by default if KVM support is present* | |
| .. _smt: | |
| Cross-Thread | |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^ | |
| The cross-thread attack vector involves a malicious userspace program or | |
| malicious VM either observing or attempting to influence the behavior of code | |
| running on the SMT sibling thread in order to exfiltrate data. | |
| Many cross-thread attacks can only be mitigated if SMT is disabled, which will | |
| result in reduced CPU core count and reduced performance. | |
| If cross-thread mitigations are fully enabled ('auto,nosmt'), all mitigations | |
| for cross-thread attacks will be enabled. SMT may be disabled depending on | |
| which vulnerabilities are present in the CPU. | |
| If cross-thread mitigations are partially enabled ('auto'), mitigations for | |
| cross-thread attacks will be enabled but SMT will not be disabled. | |
| If cross-thread mitigations are disabled, no mitigations for cross-thread | |
| attacks will be enabled. | |
| Cross-thread mitigation may not be required if core-scheduling or similar | |
| techniques are used to prevent untrusted workloads from running on SMT siblings. | |
| *cross-thread mitigations default to partially enabled* | |
| .. _cmdline: | |
| Command Line Controls | |
| --------------------- | |
| Attack vectors are controlled through the mitigations= command line option. The | |
| value provided begins with a global option and then may optionally include one | |
| or more options to disable various attack vectors. | |
| Format: | |
| | ``mitigations=[global]`` | |
| | ``mitigations=[global],[attack vectors]`` | |
| Global options: | |
| ============ ============================================================= | |
| Option Description | |
| ============ ============================================================= | |
| 'off' All attack vectors disabled. | |
| 'auto' All attack vectors enabled, partial cross-thread mitigations. | |
| 'auto,nosmt' All attack vectors enabled, full cross-thread mitigations. | |
| ============ ============================================================= | |
| Attack vector options: | |
| ================= ======================================= | |
| Option Description | |
| ================= ======================================= | |
| 'no_user_kernel' Disables user-to-kernel mitigations. | |
| 'no_user_user' Disables user-to-user mitigations. | |
| 'no_guest_host' Disables guest-to-host mitigations. | |
| 'no_guest_guest' Disables guest-to-guest mitigations | |
| 'no_cross_thread' Disables all cross-thread mitigations. | |
| ================= ======================================= | |
| Multiple attack vector options may be specified in a comma-separated list. If | |
| the global option is not specified, it defaults to 'auto'. The global option | |
| 'off' is equivalent to disabling all attack vectors. | |
| Examples: | |
| | ``mitigations=auto,no_user_kernel`` | |
| Enable all attack vectors except user-to-kernel. Partial cross-thread | |
| mitigations. | |
| | ``mitigations=auto,nosmt,no_guest_host,no_guest_guest`` | |
| Enable all attack vectors and cross-thread mitigations except for | |
| guest-to-host and guest-to-guest mitigations. | |
| | ``mitigations=,no_cross_thread`` | |
| Enable all attack vectors but not cross-thread mitigations. | |
| Interactions with command-line options | |
| -------------------------------------- | |
| Vulnerability-specific controls (e.g. "retbleed=off") take precedence over all | |
| attack vector controls. Mitigations for individual vulnerabilities may be | |
| turned on or off via their command-line options regardless of the attack vector | |
| controls. | |
| Summary of attack-vector mitigations | |
| ------------------------------------ | |
| When a vulnerability is mitigated due to an attack-vector control, the default | |
| mitigation option for that particular vulnerability is used. To use a different | |
| mitigation, please use the vulnerability-specific command line option. | |
| The table below summarizes which vulnerabilities are mitigated when different | |
| attack vectors are enabled and assuming the CPU is vulnerable. | |
| =============== ============== ============ ============= ============== ============ ======== | |
| Vulnerability User-to-Kernel User-to-User Guest-to-Host Guest-to-Guest Cross-Thread Notes | |
| =============== ============== ============ ============= ============== ============ ======== | |
| BHI X X | |
| ITS X X | |
| GDS X X X X * (Note 1) | |
| L1TF X X * (Note 2) | |
| MDS X X X X * (Note 2) | |
| MMIO X X X X * (Note 2) | |
| Meltdown X | |
| Retbleed X X * (Note 3) | |
| RFDS X X X X | |
| Spectre_v1 X | |
| Spectre_v2 X X | |
| Spectre_v2_user X X * (Note 1) | |
| SRBDS X X X X | |
| SRSO X X X X | |
| SSB X | |
| TAA X X X X * (Note 2) | |
| TSA X X X X | |
| VMSCAPE X | |
| =============== ============== ============ ============= ============== ============ ======== | |
| Notes: | |
| 1 -- Can be mitigated without disabling SMT. | |
| 2 -- Disables SMT if cross-thread mitigations are fully enabled and the CPU | |
| is vulnerable | |
| 3 -- Disables SMT if cross-thread mitigations are fully enabled, the CPU is | |
| vulnerable, and STIBP is not supported | |
| When an attack-vector is disabled, all mitigations for the vulnerabilities | |
| listed in the above table are disabled, unless mitigation is required for a | |
| different enabled attack-vector or a mitigation is explicitly selected via a | |
| vulnerability-specific command line option. |