| ========================================= | |
| Processor MMIO Stale Data Vulnerabilities | |
| ========================================= | |
| Processor MMIO Stale Data Vulnerabilities are a class of memory-mapped I/O | |
| (MMIO) vulnerabilities that can expose data. The sequences of operations for | |
| exposing data range from simple to very complex. Because most of the | |
| vulnerabilities require the attacker to have access to MMIO, many environments | |
| are not affected. System environments using virtualization where MMIO access is | |
| provided to untrusted guests may need mitigation. These vulnerabilities are | |
| not transient execution attacks. However, these vulnerabilities may propagate | |
| stale data into core fill buffers where the data can subsequently be inferred | |
| by an unmitigated transient execution attack. Mitigation for these | |
| vulnerabilities includes a combination of microcode update and software | |
| changes, depending on the platform and usage model. Some of these mitigations | |
| are similar to those used to mitigate Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) or | |
| those used to mitigate Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS). | |
| Data Propagators | |
| ================ | |
| Propagators are operations that result in stale data being copied or moved from | |
| one microarchitectural buffer or register to another. Processor MMIO Stale Data | |
| Vulnerabilities are operations that may result in stale data being directly | |
| read into an architectural, software-visible state or sampled from a buffer or | |
| register. | |
| Fill Buffer Stale Data Propagator (FBSDP) | |
| ----------------------------------------- | |
| Stale data may propagate from fill buffers (FB) into the non-coherent portion | |
| of the uncore on some non-coherent writes. Fill buffer propagation by itself | |
| does not make stale data architecturally visible. Stale data must be propagated | |
| to a location where it is subject to reading or sampling. | |
| Sideband Stale Data Propagator (SSDP) | |
| ------------------------------------- | |
| The sideband stale data propagator (SSDP) is limited to the client (including | |
| Intel Xeon server E3) uncore implementation. The sideband response buffer is | |
| shared by all client cores. For non-coherent reads that go to sideband | |
| destinations, the uncore logic returns 64 bytes of data to the core, including | |
| both requested data and unrequested stale data, from a transaction buffer and | |
| the sideband response buffer. As a result, stale data from the sideband | |
| response and transaction buffers may now reside in a core fill buffer. | |
| Primary Stale Data Propagator (PSDP) | |
| ------------------------------------ | |
| The primary stale data propagator (PSDP) is limited to the client (including | |
| Intel Xeon server E3) uncore implementation. Similar to the sideband response | |
| buffer, the primary response buffer is shared by all client cores. For some | |
| processors, MMIO primary reads will return 64 bytes of data to the core fill | |
| buffer including both requested data and unrequested stale data. This is | |
| similar to the sideband stale data propagator. | |
| Vulnerabilities | |
| =============== | |
| Device Register Partial Write (DRPW) (CVE-2022-21166) | |
| ----------------------------------------------------- | |
| Some endpoint MMIO registers incorrectly handle writes that are smaller than | |
| the register size. Instead of aborting the write or only copying the correct | |
| subset of bytes (for example, 2 bytes for a 2-byte write), more bytes than | |
| specified by the write transaction may be written to the register. On | |
| processors affected by FBSDP, this may expose stale data from the fill buffers | |
| of the core that created the write transaction. | |
| Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS) (CVE-2022-21125) | |
| ---------------------------------------------------- | |
| After propagators may have moved data around the uncore and copied stale data | |
| into client core fill buffers, processors affected by MFBDS can leak data from | |
| the fill buffer. It is limited to the client (including Intel Xeon server E3) | |
| uncore implementation. | |
| Shared Buffers Data Read (SBDR) (CVE-2022-21123) | |
| ------------------------------------------------ | |
| It is similar to Shared Buffer Data Sampling (SBDS) except that the data is | |
| directly read into the architectural software-visible state. It is limited to | |
| the client (including Intel Xeon server E3) uncore implementation. | |
| Affected Processors | |
| =================== | |
| Not all the CPUs are affected by all the variants. For instance, most | |
| processors for the server market (excluding Intel Xeon E3 processors) are | |
| impacted by only Device Register Partial Write (DRPW). | |
| Below is the list of affected Intel processors [#f1]_: | |
| =================== ============ ========= | |
| Common name Family_Model Steppings | |
| =================== ============ ========= | |
| HASWELL_X 06_3FH 2,4 | |
| SKYLAKE_L 06_4EH 3 | |
| BROADWELL_X 06_4FH All | |
| SKYLAKE_X 06_55H 3,4,6,7,11 | |
| BROADWELL_D 06_56H 3,4,5 | |
| SKYLAKE 06_5EH 3 | |
| ICELAKE_X 06_6AH 4,5,6 | |
| ICELAKE_D 06_6CH 1 | |
| ICELAKE_L 06_7EH 5 | |
| ATOM_TREMONT_D 06_86H All | |
| LAKEFIELD 06_8AH 1 | |
| KABYLAKE_L 06_8EH 9 to 12 | |
| ATOM_TREMONT 06_96H 1 | |
| ATOM_TREMONT_L 06_9CH 0 | |
| KABYLAKE 06_9EH 9 to 13 | |
| COMETLAKE 06_A5H 2,3,5 | |
| COMETLAKE_L 06_A6H 0,1 | |
| ROCKETLAKE 06_A7H 1 | |
| =================== ============ ========= | |
| If a CPU is in the affected processor list, but not affected by a variant, it | |
| is indicated by new bits in MSR IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES. As described in a later | |
| section, mitigation largely remains the same for all the variants, i.e. to | |
| clear the CPU fill buffers via VERW instruction. | |
| New bits in MSRs | |
| ================ | |
| Newer processors and microcode update on existing affected processors added new | |
| bits to IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. These bits can be used to enumerate | |
| specific variants of Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities and mitigation | |
| capability. | |
| MSR IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES | |
| -------------------------- | |
| Bit 13 - SBDR_SSDP_NO - When set, processor is not affected by either the | |
| Shared Buffers Data Read (SBDR) vulnerability or the sideband stale | |
| data propagator (SSDP). | |
| Bit 14 - FBSDP_NO - When set, processor is not affected by the Fill Buffer | |
| Stale Data Propagator (FBSDP). | |
| Bit 15 - PSDP_NO - When set, processor is not affected by Primary Stale Data | |
| Propagator (PSDP). | |
| Bit 17 - FB_CLEAR - When set, VERW instruction will overwrite CPU fill buffer | |
| values as part of MD_CLEAR operations. Processors that do not | |
| enumerate MDS_NO (meaning they are affected by MDS) but that do | |
| enumerate support for both L1D_FLUSH and MD_CLEAR implicitly enumerate | |
| FB_CLEAR as part of their MD_CLEAR support. | |
| Bit 18 - FB_CLEAR_CTRL - Processor supports read and write to MSR | |
| IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[FB_CLEAR_DIS]. On such processors, the FB_CLEAR_DIS | |
| bit can be set to cause the VERW instruction to not perform the | |
| FB_CLEAR action. Not all processors that support FB_CLEAR will support | |
| FB_CLEAR_CTRL. | |
| MSR IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL | |
| --------------------- | |
| Bit 3 - FB_CLEAR_DIS - When set, VERW instruction does not perform the FB_CLEAR | |
| action. This may be useful to reduce the performance impact of FB_CLEAR in | |
| cases where system software deems it warranted (for example, when performance | |
| is more critical, or the untrusted software has no MMIO access). Note that | |
| FB_CLEAR_DIS has no impact on enumeration (for example, it does not change | |
| FB_CLEAR or MD_CLEAR enumeration) and it may not be supported on all processors | |
| that enumerate FB_CLEAR. | |
| Mitigation | |
| ========== | |
| Like MDS, all variants of Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities have the | |
| same mitigation strategy to force the CPU to clear the affected buffers before | |
| an attacker can extract the secrets. | |
| This is achieved by using the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW instruction in | |
| combination with a microcode update. The microcode clears the affected CPU | |
| buffers when the VERW instruction is executed. | |
| Kernel does the buffer clearing with x86_clear_cpu_buffers(). | |
| On MDS affected CPUs, the kernel already invokes CPU buffer clear on | |
| kernel/userspace, hypervisor/guest and C-state (idle) transitions. No | |
| additional mitigation is needed on such CPUs. | |
| For CPUs not affected by MDS or TAA, mitigation is needed only for the attacker | |
| with MMIO capability. Therefore, VERW is not required for kernel/userspace. For | |
| virtualization case, VERW is only needed at VMENTER for a guest with MMIO | |
| capability. | |
| Mitigation points | |
| ----------------- | |
| Return to user space | |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ | |
| Same mitigation as MDS when affected by MDS/TAA, otherwise no mitigation | |
| needed. | |
| C-State transition | |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ | |
| Control register writes by CPU during C-state transition can propagate data | |
| from fill buffer to uncore buffers. Execute VERW before C-state transition to | |
| clear CPU fill buffers. | |
| Guest entry point | |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ | |
| Same mitigation as MDS when processor is also affected by MDS/TAA, otherwise | |
| execute VERW at VMENTER only for MMIO capable guests. On CPUs not affected by | |
| MDS/TAA, guest without MMIO access cannot extract secrets using Processor MMIO | |
| Stale Data vulnerabilities, so there is no need to execute VERW for such guests. | |
| Mitigation control on the kernel command line | |
| --------------------------------------------- | |
| The kernel command line allows to control the Processor MMIO Stale Data | |
| mitigations at boot time with the option "mmio_stale_data=". The valid | |
| arguments for this option are: | |
| ========== ================================================================= | |
| full If the CPU is vulnerable, enable mitigation; CPU buffer clearing | |
| on exit to userspace and when entering a VM. Idle transitions are | |
| protected as well. It does not automatically disable SMT. | |
| full,nosmt Same as full, with SMT disabled on vulnerable CPUs. This is the | |
| complete mitigation. | |
| off Disables mitigation completely. | |
| ========== ================================================================= | |
| If the CPU is affected and mmio_stale_data=off is not supplied on the kernel | |
| command line, then the kernel selects the appropriate mitigation. | |
| Mitigation status information | |
| ----------------------------- | |
| The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current | |
| vulnerability status of the system: whether the system is vulnerable, and | |
| which mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is: | |
| /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data | |
| The possible values in this file are: | |
| .. list-table:: | |
| * - 'Not affected' | |
| - The processor is not vulnerable | |
| * - 'Vulnerable' | |
| - The processor is vulnerable, but no mitigation enabled | |
| * - 'Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode' | |
| - The processor is vulnerable but microcode is not updated. The | |
| mitigation is enabled on a best effort basis. | |
| If the processor is vulnerable but the availability of the microcode | |
| based mitigation mechanism is not advertised via CPUID, the kernel | |
| selects a best effort mitigation mode. This mode invokes the mitigation | |
| instructions without a guarantee that they clear the CPU buffers. | |
| This is done to address virtualization scenarios where the host has the | |
| microcode update applied, but the hypervisor is not yet updated to | |
| expose the CPUID to the guest. If the host has updated microcode the | |
| protection takes effect; otherwise a few CPU cycles are wasted | |
| pointlessly. | |
| * - 'Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers' | |
| - The processor is vulnerable and the CPU buffer clearing mitigation is | |
| enabled. | |
| * - 'Unknown: No mitigations' | |
| - The processor vulnerability status is unknown because it is | |
| out of Servicing period. Mitigation is not attempted. | |
| Definitions: | |
| ------------ | |
| Servicing period: The process of providing functional and security updates to | |
| Intel processors or platforms, utilizing the Intel Platform Update (IPU) | |
| process or other similar mechanisms. | |
| End of Servicing Updates (ESU): ESU is the date at which Intel will no | |
| longer provide Servicing, such as through IPU or other similar update | |
| processes. ESU dates will typically be aligned to end of quarter. | |
| If the processor is vulnerable then the following information is appended to | |
| the above information: | |
| ======================== =========================================== | |
| 'SMT vulnerable' SMT is enabled | |
| 'SMT disabled' SMT is disabled | |
| 'SMT Host state unknown' Kernel runs in a VM, Host SMT state unknown | |
| ======================== =========================================== | |
| References | |
| ---------- | |
| .. [#f1] Affected Processors | |
| https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/topic-technology/software-security-guidance/processors-affected-consolidated-product-cpu-model.html |