| // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ | |
| /* | |
| * (C) Copyright 2018 Arm Ltd. | |
| * (C) Copyright 2020-2021 Samuel Holland <samuel@sholland.org> | |
| */ | |
| #define OPENSSL_API_COMPAT 0x10101000L | |
| #include <assert.h> | |
| #include <stdint.h> | |
| #include <stdio.h> | |
| #include <stdlib.h> | |
| #include <string.h> | |
| #include <openssl/asn1t.h> | |
| #include <openssl/bn.h> | |
| #include <openssl/pem.h> | |
| #include <openssl/rsa.h> | |
| #include <image.h> | |
| #include <sunxi_image.h> | |
| #include "imagetool.h" | |
| #include "mkimage.h" | |
| /* | |
| * NAND requires 8K padding. For other devices, BROM requires only | |
| * 512B padding, but let's use the larger padding to cover everything. | |
| */ | |
| #define PAD_SIZE 8192 | |
| #define pr_fmt(fmt) "mkimage (TOC0): %s: " fmt | |
| #define pr_err(fmt, args...) fprintf(stderr, pr_fmt(fmt), "error", ##args) | |
| #define pr_warn(fmt, args...) fprintf(stderr, pr_fmt(fmt), "warning", ##args) | |
| #define pr_info(fmt, args...) fprintf(stderr, pr_fmt(fmt), "info", ##args) | |
| #if defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x3050000fL | |
| #define RSA_get0_n(key) (key)->n | |
| #define RSA_get0_e(key) (key)->e | |
| #define RSA_get0_d(key) (key)->d | |
| #endif | |
| struct __packed toc0_key_item { | |
| __le32 vendor_id; | |
| __le32 key0_n_len; | |
| __le32 key0_e_len; | |
| __le32 key1_n_len; | |
| __le32 key1_e_len; | |
| __le32 sig_len; | |
| uint8_t key0[512]; | |
| uint8_t key1[512]; | |
| uint8_t reserved[32]; | |
| uint8_t sig[256]; | |
| }; | |
| /* | |
| * This looks somewhat like an X.509 certificate, but it is not valid BER. | |
| * | |
| * Some differences: | |
| * - Some X.509 certificate fields are missing or rearranged. | |
| * - Some sequences have the wrong tag. | |
| * - Zero-length sequences are accepted. | |
| * - Large strings and integers must be an even number of bytes long. | |
| * - Positive integers are not zero-extended to maintain their sign. | |
| * | |
| * See https://linux-sunxi.org/TOC0 for more information. | |
| */ | |
| struct __packed toc0_small_tag { | |
| uint8_t tag; | |
| uint8_t length; | |
| }; | |
| typedef struct toc0_small_tag toc0_small_int; | |
| typedef struct toc0_small_tag toc0_small_oct; | |
| typedef struct toc0_small_tag toc0_small_seq; | |
| typedef struct toc0_small_tag toc0_small_exp; | |
| #define TOC0_SMALL_INT(len) { 0x02, (len) } | |
| #define TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(len) { 0x30, (len) } | |
| #define TOC0_SMALL_EXP(tag, len) { 0xa0 | (tag), len } | |
| struct __packed toc0_large_tag { | |
| uint8_t tag; | |
| uint8_t prefix; | |
| uint8_t length_hi; | |
| uint8_t length_lo; | |
| }; | |
| typedef struct toc0_large_tag toc0_large_int; | |
| typedef struct toc0_large_tag toc0_large_bit; | |
| typedef struct toc0_large_tag toc0_large_seq; | |
| #define TOC0_LARGE_INT(len) { 0x02, 0x82, (len) >> 8, (len) & 0xff } | |
| #define TOC0_LARGE_BIT(len) { 0x03, 0x82, (len) >> 8, (len) & 0xff } | |
| #define TOC0_LARGE_SEQ(len) { 0x30, 0x82, (len) >> 8, (len) & 0xff } | |
| struct __packed toc0_cert_item { | |
| toc0_large_seq tag_totalSequence; | |
| struct __packed toc0_totalSequence { | |
| toc0_large_seq tag_mainSequence; | |
| struct __packed toc0_mainSequence { | |
| toc0_small_exp tag_explicit0; | |
| struct __packed toc0_explicit0 { | |
| toc0_small_int tag_version; | |
| uint8_t version; | |
| } explicit0; | |
| toc0_small_int tag_serialNumber; | |
| uint8_t serialNumber; | |
| toc0_small_seq tag_signature; | |
| toc0_small_seq tag_issuer; | |
| toc0_small_seq tag_validity; | |
| toc0_small_seq tag_subject; | |
| toc0_large_seq tag_subjectPublicKeyInfo; | |
| struct __packed toc0_subjectPublicKeyInfo { | |
| toc0_small_seq tag_algorithm; | |
| toc0_large_seq tag_publicKey; | |
| struct __packed toc0_publicKey { | |
| toc0_large_int tag_n; | |
| uint8_t n[256]; | |
| toc0_small_int tag_e; | |
| uint8_t e[3]; | |
| } publicKey; | |
| } subjectPublicKeyInfo; | |
| toc0_small_exp tag_explicit3; | |
| struct __packed toc0_explicit3 { | |
| toc0_small_seq tag_extension; | |
| struct __packed toc0_extension { | |
| toc0_small_int tag_digest; | |
| uint8_t digest[32]; | |
| } extension; | |
| } explicit3; | |
| } mainSequence; | |
| toc0_large_bit tag_sigSequence; | |
| struct __packed toc0_sigSequence { | |
| toc0_small_seq tag_algorithm; | |
| toc0_large_bit tag_signature; | |
| uint8_t signature[256]; | |
| } sigSequence; | |
| } totalSequence; | |
| }; | |
| #define sizeof_field(TYPE, MEMBER) sizeof((((TYPE *)0)->MEMBER)) | |
| static const struct toc0_cert_item cert_item_template = { | |
| TOC0_LARGE_SEQ(sizeof(struct toc0_totalSequence)), | |
| { | |
| TOC0_LARGE_SEQ(sizeof(struct toc0_mainSequence)), | |
| { | |
| TOC0_SMALL_EXP(0, sizeof(struct toc0_explicit0)), | |
| { | |
| TOC0_SMALL_INT(sizeof_field(struct toc0_explicit0, version)), | |
| 0, | |
| }, | |
| TOC0_SMALL_INT(sizeof_field(struct toc0_mainSequence, serialNumber)), | |
| 0, | |
| TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(0), | |
| TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(0), | |
| TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(0), | |
| TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(0), | |
| TOC0_LARGE_SEQ(sizeof(struct toc0_subjectPublicKeyInfo)), | |
| { | |
| TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(0), | |
| TOC0_LARGE_SEQ(sizeof(struct toc0_publicKey)), | |
| { | |
| TOC0_LARGE_INT(sizeof_field(struct toc0_publicKey, n)), | |
| {}, | |
| TOC0_SMALL_INT(sizeof_field(struct toc0_publicKey, e)), | |
| {}, | |
| }, | |
| }, | |
| TOC0_SMALL_EXP(3, sizeof(struct toc0_explicit3)), | |
| { | |
| TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(sizeof(struct toc0_extension)), | |
| { | |
| TOC0_SMALL_INT(sizeof_field(struct toc0_extension, digest)), | |
| {}, | |
| }, | |
| }, | |
| }, | |
| TOC0_LARGE_BIT(sizeof(struct toc0_sigSequence)), | |
| { | |
| TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(0), | |
| TOC0_LARGE_BIT(sizeof_field(struct toc0_sigSequence, signature)), | |
| {}, | |
| }, | |
| }, | |
| }; | |
| #define TOC0_DEFAULT_NUM_ITEMS 3 | |
| #define TOC0_DEFAULT_HEADER_LEN \ | |
| ALIGN( \ | |
| sizeof(struct toc0_main_info) + \ | |
| sizeof(struct toc0_item_info) * TOC0_DEFAULT_NUM_ITEMS + \ | |
| sizeof(struct toc0_cert_item) + \ | |
| sizeof(struct toc0_key_item), \ | |
| 32) | |
| static char *fw_key_file = "fw_key.pem"; | |
| static char *key_item_file = "key_item.bin"; | |
| static char *root_key_file = "root_key.pem"; | |
| /* | |
| * Create a key item in @buf, containing the public keys @root_key and @fw_key, | |
| * and signed by the RSA key @root_key. | |
| */ | |
| static int toc0_create_key_item(uint8_t *buf, uint32_t *len, | |
| RSA *root_key, RSA *fw_key) | |
| { | |
| struct toc0_key_item *key_item = (void *)buf; | |
| uint8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; | |
| int ret = EXIT_FAILURE; | |
| unsigned int sig_len; | |
| int n_len, e_len; | |
| /* Store key 0. */ | |
| n_len = BN_bn2bin(RSA_get0_n(root_key), key_item->key0); | |
| e_len = BN_bn2bin(RSA_get0_e(root_key), key_item->key0 + n_len); | |
| if (n_len + e_len > sizeof(key_item->key0)) { | |
| pr_err("Root key is too big for key item\n"); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| key_item->key0_n_len = cpu_to_le32(n_len); | |
| key_item->key0_e_len = cpu_to_le32(e_len); | |
| /* Store key 1. */ | |
| n_len = BN_bn2bin(RSA_get0_n(fw_key), key_item->key1); | |
| e_len = BN_bn2bin(RSA_get0_e(fw_key), key_item->key1 + n_len); | |
| if (n_len + e_len > sizeof(key_item->key1)) { | |
| pr_err("Firmware key is too big for key item\n"); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| key_item->key1_n_len = cpu_to_le32(n_len); | |
| key_item->key1_e_len = cpu_to_le32(e_len); | |
| /* Sign the key item. */ | |
| key_item->sig_len = cpu_to_le32(RSA_size(root_key)); | |
| SHA256(buf, key_item->sig - buf, digest); | |
| if (!RSA_sign(NID_sha256, digest, sizeof(digest), | |
| key_item->sig, &sig_len, root_key)) { | |
| pr_err("Failed to sign key item\n"); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (sig_len != sizeof(key_item->sig)) { | |
| pr_err("Bad key item signature length\n"); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| *len = sizeof(*key_item); | |
| ret = EXIT_SUCCESS; | |
| err: | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Verify the key item in @buf, containing two public keys @key0 and @key1, | |
| * and signed by the RSA key @key0. If @root_key is provided, only signatures | |
| * by that key will be accepted. @key1 is returned in @key. | |
| */ | |
| static int toc0_verify_key_item(const uint8_t *buf, uint32_t len, | |
| RSA *root_key, RSA **fw_key) | |
| { | |
| struct toc0_key_item *key_item = (void *)buf; | |
| uint8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; | |
| int ret = EXIT_FAILURE; | |
| int n_len, e_len; | |
| RSA *key0 = NULL; | |
| RSA *key1 = NULL; | |
| BIGNUM *n, *e; | |
| if (len < sizeof(*key_item)) | |
| goto err; | |
| /* Load key 0. */ | |
| n_len = le32_to_cpu(key_item->key0_n_len); | |
| e_len = le32_to_cpu(key_item->key0_e_len); | |
| if (n_len + e_len > sizeof(key_item->key0)) { | |
| pr_err("Bad root key size in key item\n"); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| n = BN_bin2bn(key_item->key0, n_len, NULL); | |
| e = BN_bin2bn(key_item->key0 + n_len, e_len, NULL); | |
| key0 = RSA_new(); | |
| if (!key0) | |
| goto err; | |
| if (!RSA_set0_key(key0, n, e, NULL)) | |
| goto err; | |
| /* If a root key was provided, compare it to key 0. */ | |
| if (root_key && (BN_cmp(n, RSA_get0_n(root_key)) || | |
| BN_cmp(e, RSA_get0_e(root_key)))) { | |
| pr_err("Wrong root key in key item\n"); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* Verify the key item signature. */ | |
| SHA256(buf, key_item->sig - buf, digest); | |
| if (!RSA_verify(NID_sha256, digest, sizeof(digest), | |
| key_item->sig, le32_to_cpu(key_item->sig_len), key0)) { | |
| pr_err("Bad key item signature\n"); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (fw_key) { | |
| /* Load key 1. */ | |
| n_len = le32_to_cpu(key_item->key1_n_len); | |
| e_len = le32_to_cpu(key_item->key1_e_len); | |
| if (n_len + e_len > sizeof(key_item->key1)) { | |
| pr_err("Bad firmware key size in key item\n"); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| n = BN_bin2bn(key_item->key1, n_len, NULL); | |
| e = BN_bin2bn(key_item->key1 + n_len, e_len, NULL); | |
| key1 = RSA_new(); | |
| if (!key1) | |
| goto err; | |
| if (!RSA_set0_key(key1, n, e, NULL)) | |
| goto err; | |
| if (*fw_key) { | |
| /* If a FW key was provided, compare it to key 1. */ | |
| if (BN_cmp(n, RSA_get0_n(*fw_key)) || | |
| BN_cmp(e, RSA_get0_e(*fw_key))) { | |
| pr_err("Wrong firmware key in key item\n"); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| /* Otherwise, send key1 back to the caller. */ | |
| *fw_key = key1; | |
| key1 = NULL; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| ret = EXIT_SUCCESS; | |
| err: | |
| RSA_free(key0); | |
| RSA_free(key1); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Create a certificate in @buf, describing the firmware with SHA256 digest | |
| * @digest, and signed by the RSA key @fw_key. | |
| */ | |
| static int toc0_create_cert_item(uint8_t *buf, uint32_t *len, RSA *fw_key, | |
| uint8_t digest[static SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]) | |
| { | |
| struct toc0_cert_item *cert_item = (void *)buf; | |
| uint8_t cert_digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; | |
| struct toc0_totalSequence *totalSequence; | |
| struct toc0_sigSequence *sigSequence; | |
| struct toc0_extension *extension; | |
| struct toc0_publicKey *publicKey; | |
| int ret = EXIT_FAILURE; | |
| unsigned int sig_len; | |
| memcpy(cert_item, &cert_item_template, sizeof(*cert_item)); | |
| *len = sizeof(*cert_item); | |
| /* | |
| * Fill in the public key. | |
| * | |
| * Only 2048-bit RSA keys are supported. Since this uses a fixed-size | |
| * structure, it may fail for non-standard exponents. | |
| */ | |
| totalSequence = &cert_item->totalSequence; | |
| publicKey = &totalSequence->mainSequence.subjectPublicKeyInfo.publicKey; | |
| if (BN_bn2binpad(RSA_get0_n(fw_key), publicKey->n, sizeof(publicKey->n)) < 0 || | |
| BN_bn2binpad(RSA_get0_e(fw_key), publicKey->e, sizeof(publicKey->e)) < 0) { | |
| pr_err("Firmware key is too big for certificate\n"); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* Fill in the firmware digest. */ | |
| extension = &totalSequence->mainSequence.explicit3.extension; | |
| memcpy(&extension->digest, digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH); | |
| /* | |
| * Sign the certificate. | |
| * | |
| * In older SBROM versions (and by default in newer versions), | |
| * the last 4 bytes of the certificate are not signed. | |
| * | |
| * (The buffer passed to SHA256 starts at tag_mainSequence, but | |
| * the buffer size does not include the length of that tag.) | |
| */ | |
| SHA256((uint8_t *)totalSequence, sizeof(struct toc0_mainSequence), cert_digest); | |
| sigSequence = &totalSequence->sigSequence; | |
| if (!RSA_sign(NID_sha256, cert_digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, | |
| sigSequence->signature, &sig_len, fw_key)) { | |
| pr_err("Failed to sign certificate\n"); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (sig_len != sizeof(sigSequence->signature)) { | |
| pr_err("Bad certificate signature length\n"); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ret = EXIT_SUCCESS; | |
| err: | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Verify the certificate in @buf, describing the firmware with SHA256 digest | |
| * @digest, and signed by the RSA key contained within. If @fw_key is provided, | |
| * only that key will be accepted. | |
| * | |
| * This function is only expected to work with images created by mkimage. | |
| */ | |
| static int toc0_verify_cert_item(const uint8_t *buf, uint32_t len, RSA *fw_key, | |
| uint8_t digest[static SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]) | |
| { | |
| const struct toc0_cert_item *cert_item = (const void *)buf; | |
| uint8_t cert_digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; | |
| const struct toc0_totalSequence *totalSequence; | |
| const struct toc0_sigSequence *sigSequence; | |
| const struct toc0_extension *extension; | |
| const struct toc0_publicKey *publicKey; | |
| int ret = EXIT_FAILURE; | |
| RSA *key = NULL; | |
| BIGNUM *n, *e; | |
| /* Extract the public key from the certificate. */ | |
| totalSequence = &cert_item->totalSequence; | |
| publicKey = &totalSequence->mainSequence.subjectPublicKeyInfo.publicKey; | |
| n = BN_bin2bn(publicKey->n, sizeof(publicKey->n), NULL); | |
| e = BN_bin2bn(publicKey->e, sizeof(publicKey->e), NULL); | |
| key = RSA_new(); | |
| if (!key) | |
| goto err; | |
| if (!RSA_set0_key(key, n, e, NULL)) | |
| goto err; | |
| /* If a key was provided, compare it to the embedded key. */ | |
| if (fw_key && (BN_cmp(RSA_get0_n(key), RSA_get0_n(fw_key)) || | |
| BN_cmp(RSA_get0_e(key), RSA_get0_e(fw_key)))) { | |
| pr_err("Wrong firmware key in certificate\n"); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* If a digest was provided, compare it to the embedded digest. */ | |
| extension = &totalSequence->mainSequence.explicit3.extension; | |
| if (digest && memcmp(&extension->digest, digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) { | |
| pr_err("Wrong firmware digest in certificate\n"); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* Verify the certificate's signature. See the comment above. */ | |
| SHA256((uint8_t *)totalSequence, sizeof(struct toc0_mainSequence), cert_digest); | |
| sigSequence = &totalSequence->sigSequence; | |
| if (!RSA_verify(NID_sha256, cert_digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, | |
| sigSequence->signature, | |
| sizeof(sigSequence->signature), key)) { | |
| pr_err("Bad certificate signature\n"); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ret = EXIT_SUCCESS; | |
| err: | |
| RSA_free(key); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Always create a TOC0 containing 3 items. The extra item will be ignored on | |
| * SoCs which do not support it. | |
| */ | |
| static int toc0_create(uint8_t *buf, uint32_t len, RSA *root_key, RSA *fw_key, | |
| uint8_t *key_item, uint32_t key_item_len, | |
| uint8_t *fw_item, uint32_t fw_item_len, uint32_t fw_addr) | |
| { | |
| struct toc0_main_info *main_info = (void *)buf; | |
| struct toc0_item_info *item_info = (void *)(main_info + 1); | |
| uint8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; | |
| uint32_t *buf32 = (void *)buf; | |
| RSA *orig_fw_key = fw_key; | |
| int ret = EXIT_FAILURE; | |
| uint32_t checksum = 0; | |
| uint32_t item_offset; | |
| uint32_t item_length; | |
| int i; | |
| /* Hash the firmware for inclusion in the certificate. */ | |
| SHA256(fw_item, fw_item_len, digest); | |
| /* Create the main TOC0 header, containing three items. */ | |
| memcpy(main_info->name, TOC0_MAIN_INFO_NAME, sizeof(main_info->name)); | |
| main_info->magic = cpu_to_le32(TOC0_MAIN_INFO_MAGIC); | |
| main_info->checksum = cpu_to_le32(BROM_STAMP_VALUE); | |
| main_info->num_items = cpu_to_le32(TOC0_DEFAULT_NUM_ITEMS); | |
| memcpy(main_info->end, TOC0_MAIN_INFO_END, sizeof(main_info->end)); | |
| /* The first item links the ROTPK to the signing key. */ | |
| item_offset = sizeof(*main_info) + | |
| sizeof(*item_info) * TOC0_DEFAULT_NUM_ITEMS; | |
| /* Using an existing key item avoids needing the root private key. */ | |
| if (key_item) { | |
| item_length = sizeof(*key_item); | |
| if (toc0_verify_key_item(key_item, item_length, | |
| root_key, &fw_key)) | |
| goto err; | |
| memcpy(buf + item_offset, key_item, item_length); | |
| } else if (toc0_create_key_item(buf + item_offset, &item_length, | |
| root_key, fw_key)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| item_info->name = cpu_to_le32(TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_KEY); | |
| item_info->offset = cpu_to_le32(item_offset); | |
| item_info->length = cpu_to_le32(item_length); | |
| memcpy(item_info->end, TOC0_ITEM_INFO_END, sizeof(item_info->end)); | |
| /* The second item contains a certificate signed by the firmware key. */ | |
| item_offset = item_offset + item_length; | |
| if (toc0_create_cert_item(buf + item_offset, &item_length, | |
| fw_key, digest)) | |
| goto err; | |
| item_info++; | |
| item_info->name = cpu_to_le32(TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_CERT); | |
| item_info->offset = cpu_to_le32(item_offset); | |
| item_info->length = cpu_to_le32(item_length); | |
| memcpy(item_info->end, TOC0_ITEM_INFO_END, sizeof(item_info->end)); | |
| /* The third item contains the actual boot code. */ | |
| item_offset = ALIGN(item_offset + item_length, 32); | |
| item_length = fw_item_len; | |
| if (buf + item_offset != fw_item) | |
| memmove(buf + item_offset, fw_item, item_length); | |
| item_info++; | |
| item_info->name = cpu_to_le32(TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_FIRMWARE); | |
| item_info->offset = cpu_to_le32(item_offset); | |
| item_info->length = cpu_to_le32(item_length); | |
| item_info->load_addr = cpu_to_le32(fw_addr); | |
| memcpy(item_info->end, TOC0_ITEM_INFO_END, sizeof(item_info->end)); | |
| /* Pad to the required block size with 0xff to be flash-friendly. */ | |
| item_offset = item_offset + item_length; | |
| item_length = ALIGN(item_offset, PAD_SIZE) - item_offset; | |
| memset(buf + item_offset, 0xff, item_length); | |
| /* Fill in the total padded file length. */ | |
| item_offset = item_offset + item_length; | |
| main_info->length = cpu_to_le32(item_offset); | |
| /* Verify enough space was provided when creating the image. */ | |
| assert(len >= item_offset); | |
| /* Calculate the checksum. Yes, it's that simple. */ | |
| for (i = 0; i < item_offset / 4; ++i) | |
| checksum += le32_to_cpu(buf32[i]); | |
| main_info->checksum = cpu_to_le32(checksum); | |
| ret = EXIT_SUCCESS; | |
| err: | |
| if (fw_key != orig_fw_key) | |
| RSA_free(fw_key); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| static const struct toc0_item_info * | |
| toc0_find_item(const struct toc0_main_info *main_info, uint32_t name, | |
| uint32_t *offset, uint32_t *length) | |
| { | |
| const struct toc0_item_info *item_info = (void *)(main_info + 1); | |
| uint32_t item_offset, item_length; | |
| uint32_t num_items, main_length; | |
| int i; | |
| num_items = le32_to_cpu(main_info->num_items); | |
| main_length = le32_to_cpu(main_info->length); | |
| for (i = 0; i < num_items; ++i, ++item_info) { | |
| if (le32_to_cpu(item_info->name) != name) | |
| continue; | |
| item_offset = le32_to_cpu(item_info->offset); | |
| item_length = le32_to_cpu(item_info->length); | |
| if (item_offset > main_length || | |
| item_length > main_length - item_offset) | |
| continue; | |
| *offset = item_offset; | |
| *length = item_length; | |
| return item_info; | |
| } | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| static int toc0_verify(const uint8_t *buf, uint32_t len, RSA *root_key) | |
| { | |
| const struct toc0_main_info *main_info = (void *)buf; | |
| const struct toc0_item_info *item_info; | |
| uint8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; | |
| uint32_t main_length = le32_to_cpu(main_info->length); | |
| uint32_t checksum = BROM_STAMP_VALUE; | |
| uint32_t *buf32 = (void *)buf; | |
| uint32_t length, offset; | |
| int ret = EXIT_FAILURE; | |
| RSA *fw_key = NULL; | |
| int i; | |
| if (len < main_length) | |
| goto err; | |
| /* Verify the main header. */ | |
| if (memcmp(main_info->name, TOC0_MAIN_INFO_NAME, sizeof(main_info->name))) | |
| goto err; | |
| if (le32_to_cpu(main_info->magic) != TOC0_MAIN_INFO_MAGIC) | |
| goto err; | |
| /* Verify the checksum without modifying the buffer. */ | |
| for (i = 0; i < main_length / 4; ++i) | |
| checksum += le32_to_cpu(buf32[i]); | |
| if (checksum != 2 * le32_to_cpu(main_info->checksum)) | |
| goto err; | |
| /* The length must be at least 512 byte aligned. */ | |
| if (main_length % 512) | |
| goto err; | |
| if (memcmp(main_info->end, TOC0_MAIN_INFO_END, sizeof(main_info->end))) | |
| goto err; | |
| /* Verify the key item if present (it is optional). */ | |
| item_info = toc0_find_item(main_info, TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_KEY, | |
| &offset, &length); | |
| if (!item_info) | |
| fw_key = root_key; | |
| else if (toc0_verify_key_item(buf + offset, length, root_key, &fw_key)) | |
| goto err; | |
| /* Hash the firmware to compare with the certificate. */ | |
| item_info = toc0_find_item(main_info, TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_FIRMWARE, | |
| &offset, &length); | |
| if (!item_info) { | |
| pr_err("Missing firmware item\n"); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| SHA256(buf + offset, length, digest); | |
| /* Verify the certificate item. */ | |
| item_info = toc0_find_item(main_info, TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_CERT, | |
| &offset, &length); | |
| if (!item_info) { | |
| pr_err("Missing certificate item\n"); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (toc0_verify_cert_item(buf + offset, length, fw_key, digest)) | |
| goto err; | |
| ret = EXIT_SUCCESS; | |
| err: | |
| if (fw_key != root_key) | |
| RSA_free(fw_key); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| static int toc0_check_params(struct image_tool_params *params) | |
| { | |
| if (!params->dflag) | |
| return -EINVAL; | |
| /* | |
| * If a key directory was provided, look for key files there. | |
| * Otherwise, look for them in the current directory. The key files are | |
| * the "quoted" terms in the description below. | |
| * | |
| * A summary of the chain of trust on most SoCs: | |
| * 1) eFuse contains a SHA256 digest of the public "root key". | |
| * 2) Private "root key" signs the certificate item (generated here). | |
| * 3) Certificate item contains a SHA256 digest of the firmware item. | |
| * | |
| * A summary of the chain of trust on the H6 (by default; a bit in the | |
| * BROM_CONFIG eFuse makes it work like above): | |
| * 1) eFuse contains a SHA256 digest of the public "root key". | |
| * 2) Private "root key" signs the "key item" (generated here). | |
| * 3) "Key item" contains the public "root key" and public "fw key". | |
| * 4) Private "fw key" signs the certificate item (generated here). | |
| * 5) Certificate item contains a SHA256 digest of the firmware item. | |
| * | |
| * This means there are three valid ways to generate a TOC0: | |
| * 1) Provide the private "root key" only. This works everywhere. | |
| * For H6, the "root key" will also be used as the "fw key". | |
| * 2) FOR H6 ONLY: Provide the private "root key" and a separate | |
| * private "fw key". | |
| * 3) FOR H6 ONLY: Provide the private "fw key" and a pre-existing | |
| * "key item" containing the corresponding public "fw key". | |
| * In this case, the private "root key" can be kept offline. The | |
| * "key item" can be extracted from a TOC0 image generated using | |
| * method #2 above. | |
| * | |
| * Note that until the ROTPK_HASH eFuse is programmed, any "root key" | |
| * will be accepted by the BROM. | |
| */ | |
| if (params->keydir) { | |
| if (asprintf(&fw_key_file, "%s/%s", params->keydir, fw_key_file) < 0) | |
| return -ENOMEM; | |
| if (asprintf(&key_item_file, "%s/%s", params->keydir, key_item_file) < 0) | |
| return -ENOMEM; | |
| if (asprintf(&root_key_file, "%s/%s", params->keydir, root_key_file) < 0) | |
| return -ENOMEM; | |
| } | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| static int toc0_verify_header(unsigned char *buf, int image_size, | |
| struct image_tool_params *params) | |
| { | |
| int ret = EXIT_FAILURE; | |
| RSA *root_key = NULL; | |
| FILE *fp; | |
| /* A root public key is optional. */ | |
| fp = fopen(root_key_file, "rb"); | |
| if (fp) { | |
| pr_info("Verifying image with existing root key\n"); | |
| root_key = PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL); | |
| if (!root_key) | |
| root_key = PEM_read_RSAPublicKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL); | |
| fclose(fp); | |
| if (!root_key) { | |
| pr_err("Failed to read public key from '%s'\n", | |
| root_key_file); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| ret = toc0_verify(buf, image_size, root_key); | |
| err: | |
| RSA_free(root_key); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| static const char *toc0_item_name(uint32_t name) | |
| { | |
| if (name == TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_CERT) | |
| return "Certificate"; | |
| if (name == TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_FIRMWARE) | |
| return "Firmware"; | |
| if (name == TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_KEY) | |
| return "Key"; | |
| return "(unknown)"; | |
| } | |
| static void toc0_print_header(const void *buf) | |
| { | |
| const struct toc0_main_info *main_info = buf; | |
| const struct toc0_item_info *item_info = (void *)(main_info + 1); | |
| uint32_t head_length, main_length, num_items; | |
| uint32_t item_offset, item_length, item_name; | |
| int load_addr = -1; | |
| int i; | |
| num_items = le32_to_cpu(main_info->num_items); | |
| head_length = sizeof(*main_info) + num_items * sizeof(*item_info); | |
| main_length = le32_to_cpu(main_info->length); | |
| printf("Allwinner TOC0 Image\n" | |
| "Size: %d bytes\n" | |
| "Contents: %d items\n" | |
| " 00000000:%08x Headers\n", | |
| main_length, num_items, head_length); | |
| for (i = 0; i < num_items; ++i, ++item_info) { | |
| item_offset = le32_to_cpu(item_info->offset); | |
| item_length = le32_to_cpu(item_info->length); | |
| item_name = le32_to_cpu(item_info->name); | |
| if (item_name == TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_FIRMWARE) | |
| load_addr = le32_to_cpu(item_info->load_addr); | |
| printf(" %08x:%08x %s\n", | |
| item_offset, item_length, | |
| toc0_item_name(item_name)); | |
| } | |
| if (num_items && item_offset + item_length < main_length) { | |
| item_offset = item_offset + item_length; | |
| item_length = main_length - item_offset; | |
| printf(" %08x:%08x Padding\n", | |
| item_offset, item_length); | |
| } | |
| if (load_addr != -1) | |
| printf("Load address: 0x%08x\n", load_addr); | |
| } | |
| static void toc0_set_header(void *buf, struct stat *sbuf, int ifd, | |
| struct image_tool_params *params) | |
| { | |
| uint32_t key_item_len = 0; | |
| uint8_t *key_item = NULL; | |
| int ret = EXIT_FAILURE; | |
| RSA *root_key = NULL; | |
| RSA *fw_key = NULL; | |
| FILE *fp; | |
| /* Either a key item or the root private key is required. */ | |
| fp = fopen(key_item_file, "rb"); | |
| if (fp) { | |
| pr_info("Creating image using existing key item\n"); | |
| key_item_len = sizeof(struct toc0_key_item); | |
| key_item = OPENSSL_malloc(key_item_len); | |
| if (!key_item || fread(key_item, key_item_len, 1, fp) != 1) { | |
| pr_err("Failed to read key item from '%s'\n", | |
| root_key_file); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| fclose(fp); | |
| fp = NULL; | |
| } | |
| fp = fopen(root_key_file, "rb"); | |
| if (fp) { | |
| root_key = PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL); | |
| if (!root_key) | |
| root_key = PEM_read_RSAPublicKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL); | |
| fclose(fp); | |
| fp = NULL; | |
| } | |
| /* When using an existing key item, the root key is optional. */ | |
| if (!key_item && (!root_key || !RSA_get0_d(root_key))) { | |
| pr_err("Failed to read private key from '%s'\n", | |
| root_key_file); | |
| pr_info("Try 'openssl genrsa -out root_key.pem'\n"); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* The certificate/firmware private key is always required. */ | |
| fp = fopen(fw_key_file, "rb"); | |
| if (fp) { | |
| fw_key = PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL); | |
| fclose(fp); | |
| fp = NULL; | |
| } | |
| if (!fw_key) { | |
| /* If the root key is a private key, it can be used instead. */ | |
| if (root_key && RSA_get0_d(root_key)) { | |
| pr_info("Using root key as firmware key\n"); | |
| fw_key = root_key; | |
| } else { | |
| pr_err("Failed to read private key from '%s'\n", | |
| fw_key_file); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* Warn about potential compatibility issues. */ | |
| if (key_item || fw_key != root_key) | |
| pr_warn("Only H6 supports separate root and firmware keys\n"); | |
| ret = toc0_create(buf, params->file_size, root_key, fw_key, | |
| key_item, key_item_len, | |
| buf + TOC0_DEFAULT_HEADER_LEN, | |
| params->orig_file_size, params->addr); | |
| err: | |
| OPENSSL_free(key_item); | |
| OPENSSL_free(root_key); | |
| if (fw_key != root_key) | |
| OPENSSL_free(fw_key); | |
| if (fp) | |
| fclose(fp); | |
| if (ret != EXIT_SUCCESS) | |
| exit(ret); | |
| } | |
| static int toc0_check_image_type(uint8_t type) | |
| { | |
| return type == IH_TYPE_SUNXI_TOC0 ? 0 : 1; | |
| } | |
| static int toc0_vrec_header(struct image_tool_params *params, | |
| struct image_type_params *tparams) | |
| { | |
| tparams->hdr = calloc(tparams->header_size, 1); | |
| /* Save off the unpadded data size for SHA256 calculation. */ | |
| params->orig_file_size = params->file_size - TOC0_DEFAULT_HEADER_LEN; | |
| /* Return padding to 8K blocks. */ | |
| return ALIGN(params->file_size, PAD_SIZE) - params->file_size; | |
| } | |
| U_BOOT_IMAGE_TYPE( | |
| sunxi_toc0, | |
| "Allwinner TOC0 Boot Image support", | |
| TOC0_DEFAULT_HEADER_LEN, | |
| NULL, | |
| toc0_check_params, | |
| toc0_verify_header, | |
| toc0_print_header, | |
| toc0_set_header, | |
| NULL, | |
| toc0_check_image_type, | |
| NULL, | |
| toc0_vrec_header | |
| ); |